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style; and his quotations and citations of authorities fill an appendix of more
than 200 pages.
It seems inevitable that this work will receive some uncomplimentary and
even angry reviews. This is because the author's opinions are so often con-
trary to opinions that are currently held by respected scholars and judges
and accepted as a matter of course by large numbers of people, and because
they are expressed in such positive and uncompromising form. He often does
much to dim, in varying degrees, the effulgent halos that we have rejoiced
to create about the heads of our political and judicial heroes. Certainly he
would have created less disapproval, and possibly he would have been more
effective in attaining his ends, if he had been more considerate of human feel-
ings and opinions and more moderate in his criticisms. In no case, however,
was the present reviewer offended, even when his views were contradicted
and his own heroes belittled. This is because he was convinced at every point
that the author's only desire was to present the truth, that he had used the
proper methods of research to determine the facts, and that the facts as he
found them had induced the opinions that are expressed.
ARnTHR L. ConInN'
FOR many years there have been rumors of revolutionary doings in con-
stitutional history at the University of Chicago Law School. Professor Cross-
key was reputed to be traveling around the country looking at old tombstones
and unearthing ancient and forgotten manuscripts, all with an eve to estab-
lishing novel theories about the meaning of the Constitution. Those who heard
these rumors and have since waited anxiously for the publication of the results
of his research will not be disappointed. These two volumes constitute one of
the most all-embracing broadsides ever made at orthodox history.
2%r. Crosskey's fundamental thesis is that the Convention of 1787 proposed,
the states ratified, and the early Congresses operated under a Constitution
that provided a unitary, centralized government. The election of Jefferson,
according to Mr. Crosskey. marked the beginning of a "states' rights" trend
that ran on for fifty years or so, by which time the true meaning of the Con-
stitution had been completely obscured. The causes of this shift, apparently
related to the slavery issue, are left for a later study.' For the present, Mr.
Crosskey limits himself substantially to an analysis of the meaning of the
original document.
He starts his analysis with the Commerce Clause. Under the commonly
accepted theory that the United States is a government of delegated powers,
limited principally to those contained in Article I, Section 8, of the Consti-
tution, the central government has had to build its control over economic
activity almost wholly by use of its power to regulate commerce. Consequently,
tWilUiam K. Townsend Professor of Law, Emeritus, Yale Law School
1. See p. 1151 infra.
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the United States Reports are filled with hundreds of decisions drawing lines
between that commerce subject to regulation by the United States and that
commerce reserved to the states for regulation. Most of these decisions came
after the Civil War, by which time the states' rights theory of state sover-
eignty was well accepted, and the approach to be taken in analyzing the
extent of federal power over commerce rested on the theory that the states
had given up only a necessary minimum of their sovereignty. Out of this
grew distinctions between interstate and intrastate commerce, between direct
and indirect effects on interstate commerce, and similar legalistic hair-split-
ting, the absurdity of which Mr. Crosskey demonstrates by analyzing some
selected early twentieth century Supreme Court cases. He is unwilling to
find the able drafters of the Constitution guilty of creating such an unrealistic
and unworkable relationship between the nation and the states as the Com-
merce Clause gloss by the Supreme Court appears to require. He tosses aside
the gloss and turns instead to the actual language of the Constitution, which
contains no such prefixes as "inter" and "intra." In a most painstaking way
he dissects the clause in terms of the usages of the eighteenth century and
makes out a persuasive case for the proposition that "commerce among the
several states" meant "all gainful economic activity within the boundaries of
the nation."
This established, he goes on to consider the interrelationship of the Imports
and Exports, Ex Post Facto, and Contracts Clauses of Section 10 of Article
1.2 Again by reference to the language of the eighteenth century, he shows
that "exports" and "imports" were terms used for goods shipped from and
into states; they were not terms limited to foreign trade. This was in fact
stated to be the case by Chief Justice Marshall as late as 182 7,a but in 1868
Justice Miller in Woodruff v. Parham 4 destroyed any such interpretation
and substituted instead the theory that the Commerce Clause had a negative
implication in that it forbade discrimination against "interstate" commerce.
Mr. Crosskey drily comments: "[H]ow the Commerce Clause-a mere grant
of power to Congress-could do such a thing, the Justice did not explain;
and the puzzle has never been elucidated from that day to this."r' From this
2. "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its in-
spection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Im-
ports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such
Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress."
"No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts. .. "
3. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U.S. 1827).
4. 8 Wall. 123 (U.S. 1868).
5. P. 315. Mr. Crosskey is not one to hide his feelings. On the same page he
describes justice Miller thus: "One of the great destructive geniuses of the Court, Miller
had a principal part, not only in this outstanding piece of 'judicial statesmanship,' but in
all those other queer decisions, just after the Civil War, by which, for a variety of dif-
ferent reasons no doubt, the Southern sophistical views of the Constitution were, in so
many instances, fastened upon a victorious country."
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case to date, Mr. Crosskey demonstrates, the Court has been floundering about,
tr3ing to strike down interstate trade barriers by use of a theory spun out of
no constitutional language whatsoever.
The law merchant is part of the broad definition of "commerce" that Mr.
Crosskey presents, and he believes that the Contracts Clause was meant to
be a prohibition against state control over private commercial relations. To
establish this, he must first eliminate the commonly accepted theory that the
clause was the general protection against unfair retrospective legislation. This
he does by arguing that the Ex Post Facto Clause was incorrectly construed
in Calder v. Bzdl where it was asserted that that clause was limited to crimi-
nal matters. If he is right in this-and his demonstration is highly persua-
sive-then the Contracts Clause is unnecessary if limited to retrospective
matters. He argues, therefore, that the true purpose of the Contracts Clause
was to preclude the states from legislating in the field of the law merchant.
The Imports and Exports and Contracts Clauses taken together, then, would
come close to making the federal power over commerce exclusive.
Mr. Crosskey's views on commerce are consistent with a theory that the
United States is a government of limited delegated powers. He is not content
to rest there, however, and devotes a major portion of his study to a demon-
stration that the Convention of 1787 in fact created a unitary government
possessing substantially all powers of government. In support of this he relies
on two major rules of interpretation prevalent in the eighteenth century. One
is that the spirit and intent of a document are more important than the literal
words, a rule of special importance where there is an appropriate preamble
to the document. The other is a rule that a general statement followed by
particulars is not normally to be taken to mean that the enumerated particulars
define the limits of coverage because to limit the general statement to the
subsequent particulars usually makes the general statement ineffective. For
example, a statute might give a dog warden authority to destroy vicious or
dangerous dogs, and in subordinate provisions might state that a dog with
rabies should be killed upon a veterinarian's certificate that the dog had rabies,
that a dog which attacked sheep should be killed upon the affidavit of a sheep
owner, and that a dog which attacked people should be killed upon the request
of the police. Under eighteenth century rules as explained by Mr. Cross-
key, these specifications would never be construed to limit "vicious or danger-
ous" so that the warden had no power with respect to a dog that viciously
attacked other dogs.
By use of these two rules, Mr. Crosskey argues that the Constitution granted
to Congress all legislative power possessed by the United States and that that
legislative power embraced all that is necessary to "form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty." To estab-
lish this proposition he must cope with the enumeration of various specific
powers in Section 8 of Article I. He notes, of course, that the last clause of
6. 3 Dall. 385 (U.S. 1798).
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Section 8, the so-called "sweeping clause," indicates that Congress has powers
over and above the enumerations preceding that clause, for it authorizes
necessary and proper laws for executing "all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof." And this, he argues, is an important provision when
related to the sweep of the Preamble. He then takes up the many enumerated
powers and offers explanations for their inclusion notwithstanding the suffi-
ciency, under his argument, of a simple grant of legislative power to Congress.
The majority of the enumerated powers, he maintains, were put in to make
it certain that they would not be considered prerogatives of the executive in
much the same way many things were matters of the royal prerogative in
England.7 The remainder of the enumerated powers are explained on various
other grounds. In some cases, he asserts, the inclusion was primarily to ex-
press a limitation on the power, as for example, the power to enact uniform
naturalization laws. In others, he maintains, it was advisable to set forth
expressly powers that had been in the Articles of Confederation for fear that
omission might raise the question whether it was intended that they be car-
ried over. Two are included, he believes, as much for public relations pur-
poses as any other: the power to tax and the power to regulate commerce.
The absence of these being the primary causes of dissatisfaction with the
Articles of Confederation, he argues, the Convention spelled them out to make
it crystal clear that the great faults had been eliminated.
There is one anomalous power that has a special explanation, the detailing
of which will perhaps give some of the flavor of Mr. Crosskey's method in
erecting his argument that the several powers were enumerated for special
reasons. In Section 8 it is provided that Congress shall have power "to pro-
vide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of
the United States." Even under a theory of delegated powers, one is hard
put to explain the inclusion of this power, for it is obviously "necessary and
proper" in executing the power to coin money. But counterfeiting was one
of the forms of treason under the English law as it existed in the colonies,
and the Constitution in Article III so defines treason as to exclude counter-
feiting. Therefore, the argument goes, in an abundance of caution the Con-
vention included the power to provide punishment for counterfeiting to dem-
onstrate that counterfeiting was unlawful even though it was no longer treason.
The foregoing as developed by Mr. Crosskey is a matter of logic; there is
nothing set forth to show that anyone ever said or urote that this was the
reason for the inclusion of the power. It is simply a case of deducing a logical
reason consistent with Mr. Crosskey's primary thesis that Congress was sup-
7. It is important to note that Mr. Crosskey relies heavily on Blackstone's elucidation
of many royal executive powers which, if Blackstone were to be followed, would perhaps
be taken over by the President because he succeeded to the executive authority of the
king. Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-322 (1936),
where Justice Sutherland states that the power to enter into negotiations with foreign
nations was transferred directly from the King of England to the colonies as a "union"
and then to the President.
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posed to have general legislative power over all matters of general concern.
This reason for the counterfeiting provision is not necessarily the only one.
It may be that Delegate X had a peculiar worry about counterfeiting and
insisted on its inclusion and the other delegates, seeing that it did no harm,
may have placated the insistent delegate. The most that can be said for Mr.
Crosskey's theory is that it is logical and makes more sense than the sort
of thing that must be dreamed up otherwise to explain the specific inclusion
of the power to punish counterfeiting.
An integral part of Mr. Crosskey's thesis is the proposition that the common
law was a brooding omnipresence in the sky and that it settled in the national
government under the Constitution. If he is right about this, it becomes more
understandable why the commerce power was believed to be so all-embracing
and why Congress was considered to have general legislative power; for if
the common law in the United States was to be a national common law as in
England and if the individual states were involved only in the manner that
local customs in England affected English law, then only the national legis-
lature could effect necessary changes in the common law. There is no need
here to discuss generally this part of Mr. Crosskey's work,8 but it is appro-
priate to point out a relationship between the previously mentioned counter-
feiting provision and the theory of a national common law. Mr. CrossIzey
argues that the limitations on the definition and punishment of treason in
Article III must have been considered by the drafters to be limitations only
on the judiciary because they obviously do not prevent Congress from mak-
ing certain acts crimes and punishing them just so long as they are not called
treason. But if this is true, he goes on, then the Convention must have believed
that the English common law of crimes would be operative in the absence of
any Congressional legislation on the subject and that the breadth of the Eng-
lish law of treason and the inhuman punishment therefor, if it was to be for-
bidden forthwith, had to be done by limiting the judiciary's power under the
common law. He likewise notes that the counterfeiting provision does not
provide that Congress shall have power to define and punish-as is the case
with the piracies provision-but only to punish, which again would appear to
evidence a belief that counterfeiting would be a common law misdemeanor
prior to any determination by Congress of appropriate punishment.
Part of Mr. Crosskey's theory about the nature of "law" at the time of the
writing of the Constitution is the proposition that the United States Supreme
Court was expected to be the head of the entire judicial system of the country.
It was expected, he argues, to supervise both state and federal litigation in
order to preserve the consistency of the common law throughout the country.
By virtue of the Supremacy Clause the Court was also given control over
local legislation that might contravene the Constitution, but, he believes, the
Court was not expected to have any power over the constitutionality of Acts
of Congress, except any Acts that encroached on judicial prerogatives. Granted
8. See Professor Corbin's Review, p. 1137 supra.
19531 1149
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
that Congress was to have plenary power to legislate for the general welfare
and to regulate all economic activity including the power to alter the common
law, it is not hard to believe that the drafters would not include a power of
review over Congress, if only because there would be so few limitations to be
enforced. Mr. Crosskey is not content, however, with this logical argument;
he also maintains that there was no substantial history of state judicial review
prior to the Convention and that the proceedings of the Convention itself do
not support judicial review. He doubts that anything so novel would be left
to implication.
Mr. Crosskey also takes on the Bill of Rights and, just to round out the
picture, the Fourteenth Amendment. The Bill of Rights, or at least Amend-
ments II through VIII, he argues, were intended to apply to the states as
well as to the United States. They do not, he points out, appear as does the
First Amendment to be limited to the United States, for their language is
general whereas in the First Amendment only Congress is forbidden to act.
He also argues that in some of the ratifying conventions the need for a Bill
of Rights was presented in a context that indicated a desire for protection
by means of the Supremacy Clause against abuses in the states.10 Finally,
he places great stock in the vicissitudes of the draft of the First Amendment
through 'Congress. At one time the language proposed was general, and it
was at the insistence of New Englanders whose states still had an established
church that the draft was made operative only against the Congress, a cir-
cumstance that leads Mr. 'Crosskey to conclude that Congress viewed general
language as applicable to states and that the switch in form in the First
Amendment was to preserve the validity of established churches.11 This theory
forces him to observe that Marshall and Story were falsely interpreting the
Constitution when in Barron v. Baltimore 12 Marshall held the Bill of Rights
inapplicable to the states. These strong nationalist judges are forgiven, how-
ever, for Mr. Crosskey is sure that they were simply bowing to the states'
rights sentiment of the times.
Mr. Crosskey concludes his analysis by a consideration of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Here he joins those who maintain that the Amendment over-
ruled Barron v. Baltimore. This analysis is almost wholly logical and omits
any consideration of the progress of the Amendment through Congress and
the ratifying legislatures. This omission is perhaps the one sour note in an
otherwise convincing exposition of the Constitution; in all other instances
9. The last part of the Seventh Amendment is also applicable by its terms only to the
United States.
10. One wonders, however, why a fear in the states that their own judiciary could
-not protect them would not also give rise to a fear which would express itself in a demand
for judicial review of Acts of Congress. Distrust of state legislatures would seem likely
to give rise to distrust of all legislatures.
11. Mr. Crosskey points out that the prohibition against Congress' establishing a
religion would seem to involve a belief that Congress had a broad enough power to in-
clude such legislation.
12. 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. 1833).
[Vol. 621150
REVIEWS
he relies on-or gives the impression of so doing-contemporary evidence
of the meaning of constitutional provisions. With reference to the Fourteenth
Amendment he not only ignores the history of the Amendment, he even
attacks those who do rely on that history when he claims that one such writer
"apparently forgets that the ultimate question is not what the legislatures
meant, any more than it is what Congress or the more immediate framers
of the amendment meant: it is what the amendment means[ !]*'s
In approaching the problem of evaluating Mr. Crosskey's work it is im-
portant to note that he has, in effect, requested a delay in judgment. He has
not produced in these two volumes the total findings of his research. In
general, he has withheld an analysis of the Convention proceedings, the rati-
fication campaign, and the story, as he views it, of the fairly rapid shift of
large groups in the country from support of a strong government to advocacy
of states' rights. All of this is to be considered in further volumes. This
promise of more to come blunts one's critical comment, for many of the ques-
tions that come to mind are certain to be covered in these additional volumes.
For example, the great shift in constitutional interpretation was brought about
by the Jeffersonians. If Mr. Crosskey is correct in his major thesis, the dele-
gates to the Convention were in the main nationalists. Some time between
1787 and 1801 many of these must have changed their minds. Unless he can
present a convincing explanation of this change, his major thesis becomes
suspect.
Notwithstanding this difficulty of judging a work that is incomplete, it is
possible to comment on the methodology of the published part. In many ways
the work is highly persuasive. His painstaking research into the language of
the times and the rules of interpretation of legal documents then in vogue
appears to be accurate and the conclusions he draws seem reasonable. He
especially makes out a good case for placing a great deal of reliance on Black-
stone's Commentaries as a source for understanding the Constitution, for
apparently the Commentaries were at that time the one law book universally
read both by lawyers and educated laymen. He also makes out a good case
for viewing with suspicion much that appears in The Federalist because, as
he argues, the essays therein were written for publication in an anti-Federalist
stronghold and were probably tailored to allay the fears of the doubting. He
is further to be congratulated for making a valiant effort to read the Consti-
tution with a completely open mind. After very little study of the gloss on the
Constitution, to say nothing of reading words in their contemporary sense, it
becomes difficult to read its words without automatically including meanings
added through the years. Finally, there is no gainsaying the fact that Mr.
Crosskey has used only original sources and that he has uncovered what ap-
pears to be material not before considered by students of the subjecL
But his arguments are not based on historical material alone. In much of
his analysis he relies on logic, and this frequently cuts both ways. For example,
13. P. 1381, n.11.
195:3] 1151
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
he argues that in Marbury v. Madison,14 Marshall asserted the power of the
Court to pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress only because he
had to have a way out of the political dilemma which Jefferson had forced on
the Court. Marshall could not issue the writ of mandamus, for he knew it
would be ignored; neither could he safely say that Marbury was not entitled
to his commission, for this would be politically disastrous to the Federalists,
to say nothing of subversive of orderly government. Therefore, Mr. Cross-
key concludes, Marshall, who must have known that the Constitution did not
include the power of judicial review over Acts of Congress, used this very
argument as the way out. All of this is a matter of deduction, for nowhere
does Marshall give any hint that such was his strategy. But the difficulty with
this logic is that Marshall could have achieved the same result by limiting the
power of judicial review to the protection of the prerogatives of the judiciary
against encroachment, a limited power of review which Mr. Crosskey con-
cedes the Constitution can be read to provide for. As between two theories
of judicial review, one "right" and one "wrong," one would assume that Mar-
shall would rely on the "right" one, the limited power of the Court to inter-
pret its own Article III. That Marshall did not do this seems logically to
lead to the conclusion that he, who must have known the right answer, set
forth exactly what the Constitutional Convention really meant to provide for.
To this there is a counter argument. Marshall, it could be said, provided for
broader review because he wanted to undercut the Kentucky and Virginia
Resolutions which purported to give the states power to override Acts of
Congress. But to this one can reply (1) that an assertion of supervisory
power over Congress is an admission that the national powers are limited,
and that is inconsistent with Marshall's nationalist sentiments; and (2) that
the power once created might be misused if and when the Jeffersonians cap-
tured the Court and the Federalists regained control of Congress and the
Presidency. The long and short of the matter is that to the extent that Mr.
Crosskey relies on logic alone he can never satisfactorily prove his point.
The most he can do is show that the traditional meaning is not necessarily
valid.
Somewhat akin to his reliance on logic is what seems to be his fundamental
premise that the Constitution was in all respects consistently and tightly
drafted. -le assumes an almost perfect document, and when he gets through
with his analysis the parts fit together ever so neatly. But it seems likely
that there were minor compromises of terminology, to say nothing of sub-
stantive provisions. We know, of course, of the great compromise between
the large and small states. It seems equally probable that various delegates
had their pet wants and peeves and that little changes were made here and
there to placate various delegates or states. If so, Mr. Crosskey proves too
much by producing perfection. The very fact that he is able to do this makes
one doubtful that everything he concludes can possibly be right. There ought
to be, it seems, a little more fallibility on the part of the Founding Fathers.
14. 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803).
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Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of this study is a minor fault that
many will probably consider major. The entire work is written with a chip
on the shoulder. There is a belligerency about it that is traditional in a lav-
yer's brief, but not in a scholarly historical treatise. This belligerency has
the effect of putting the reader-especially the ortodox historian---on his
guard. Even if one approaches it with an open mind and an amused toler-
ance of some of the nastier digs at various Presidents, Justices, historians, and
law teachers, there is still something suspicious about the use of the brief-
writing technique. For example, Mr. Crosskey discusses at length the case of
Daly's Lessee v. James.' He makes much of the fact that two "leading lawyers
-in the Supreme Court. at least-,"' 6 Henry Wheaton and David B. Ogden.
argued for the plaintiff in a manner that fits Crosskev's thesis. Reference is
also made by him to "[c]ounsel for the defendant," not otherwise identified,
who argued for a position contrary to that taken by 'Mr. Crosskey. Leaving
aside the question whether the attorneys for the plaintiff believed whole-
heartedly in their position-a question raised by Mr. Crosslexv himelf from
time to time, especially with regard to The Federalist--one becomes interested
in knowing who was the unidentified counsel for the defendant. It turns out
to be Sergeant, either John, "an acknowledged leader of a fanous bar,"'-
or Thomas, who was not so famous as his brother but was a competent lawyer
and a legal scholar and writer of some note.' All of which proves nothing,
of course, but certainly makes one wonder about the fairness of the presenta-
tion. In many ways Mr. Crosskey reveals the scholar's true search for the
truth, and he frequently notes carefully that he has given the reader all the
information he could find on a point. He would be even more persuasive
had he completely suppressed the advocate's argumentative tricksy1
The practicing lawyer and the man in the street may very well dismiss this
study and the one to follow as of no importance today. Ve all know that the
Constitution is what the judges say it is, and if \fr. Crosskey is right the
judges have given us a lot of bum steers. But that still leaves the Constitution
right where it was; it is what the judges, right or wrong, say it is. And if
the Constitution is to be changed here and now it will be for present day
reasons, not for reasons existing in 1787 and now revealed for the first time.
The most that a new light on the Constitution will do is provide an argument
in support of a position chosen for other reasons. Furthermore, a large num-
ber of people have lived happily under this erroneous frame of government,
and nothing that Mlr. Crosskey proves can eliminate this past and present
15. 8 Wheat. 495 (U.S. 1823).
16. P. 835.
17. 16 DicnONmuY oF AmmcN BiOGRAPHY 5,S (1935).
18. Id. at 590.
19. There is a story of a great legal scholar who laborcd for years to reconcile all
the cases in his field but in the end was unable to cope with four of them. In disgust he
threw the volumes containing those four out the window and published his wor: vithuut
mentioning them. I sometimes had the feeling that perhaps Mr. Crosskey occasionally
forgot unpleasant facts.
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